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Abstract—Fake audio detection is expected to become an 
important research area in the field of smart speakers such 
as Google Home, Amazon Echo and chatbots developed for 
these platforms. This paper presents replay attack 
vulnerability of voice-driven interfaces and proposes a 
countermeasure to detect replay attack on these platforms. 
This paper presents a novel framework to model replay 
attack distortion, and then use a non-learning-based method 
for replay attack detection on smart speakers. The reply 
attack distortion is modeled as a higher-order nonlinearity in 
the replay attack audio. Higher-order spectral analysis 
(HOSA) is used to capture characteristics distortions in the 
replay audio. Effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure 
scheme is evaluated on original speech as well as 
corresponding replayed recordings. The replay attack 
recordings are successfully injected into the Google Home 
device via Amazon Alexa using the drop-in conferencing 
feature. 
Keywords—Automatic Speaker Verification, Voice-Driven 
Interfaces, Vulnerability analysis of Google Home and Amazon 
Echo, Audio replay attack, higher-order spectral analysis 
(HOSA) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The growing trend of personalization, increasing number of 
smart homes, the desire for easy control of home IoT devices 
and rising consumer preference for luxurious entertainment 
systems are driving factors for the tremendous growth of 
smart speakers. Alone in 2017, approximately 40 million 
adults in the United States have adopted voice activated 
smart speakers. With a compound annual growth rate of 
35%, global smart speaker market is projected to rise during 
forecast period 2017-2024 [1].   
Gartner estimated that by 2020, 75% of US households are 
expected to have voice-driven interfaces, e.g., Alexa, 
Cortana, Google Assistant, Siri, and, so on [2], and  
worldwide spending on these platforms and devices is 
expected to be more than $3.5 billion by 2021 [3].  
Currently, based on intelligent virtual assistant used in smart 
speakers, market leaders include Alexa, Cortana, Google 
Assistant, and Siri. Various home and office voice-driven 
applications rely on software development platforms 
provided by Alexa skills and Google Action. It is estimated 
that currently chatbots are handling around 30% of customer-
service requests, and by 2020 chatbots are expected to handle 
85% of customer-service interactions [4]. In addition, 
through voice, intelligent virtual assistants and smart 
speakers are being used to remotely control different Internet 
of things (IoT) gadgets such as controlling thermostats and 
doorlocks. Therefore, it becomes imperative to secure the 
voice-drive interfaces and associated applications and access 
control systems (speaker recognition systems) are vulnerable 
to replay audio (RA) attacks, impersonation, speech 
synthesis and voice conversion. Smart speakers enables 
attacker to remotely attack voice-driven interfaces and 
applications. Among these four attacks, audio replay is the 
easiest to exploit [6], whereby the pre-recorded speech of the 
target speaker is played back to for automatic speaker 
verification (ASV) task. The ASV, a key component of 
voice-based authentication and access control systems, is a 
process of the authenticating users by doing analysis on their 
speech utterances. The ASV has received significant 
attention in the last two decades due to its convenience, low 
cost, and remote operability with simple devices like mobile 
phones. The role of ASV is expected to increase further due 
to proliferation of voice-driven interfaces and virtual 
personal assistant-enabled wireless speakers.  
Many technologies are used for ASV such as frequency 
eestimation, hidden Markov models, Gaussian mixture 
models, vector quantization, decision trees, and neural 
networks [5]. The ASVspoof 2017 Challenge [18] was 
focused on the exploiting shortcomings of existing state-of-
the-art to detect replay attacks under diverse conditions. 
Efforts have been made to investigate replay attacks on ASV 
systems [12–17]. For instance, Patil et al. in [12] study the 
spectral changes due to the transmission and channel 
characteristic of replay devices for replay detection. Another 
attempt was made to capture the channel information 
embedded in the low signal to noise ratio region, a single 
frequency filtering feature with high spectro-temporal 
resolution was proposed in [13]. Most of the presented works 
in ASVspoof 2017 challenge used a combination of different 
features and classifiers to improve performance of replay 
detection system. The combined feature vector include 
constant Q cepstral coefficients, mel-frequency cepstral 
coefficients, linear frequency cepstral coefficients, 
rectangular filter cepstral coefficients, perceptual linear 
predictive and deep features as front-ends [14, 15]. 
Magnitude-based features are widely used in replay attack 
detection, [14, 15], and frequency modulation (FM) features 
have been used in speech recognition and speaker 
recognition [16, 17]. 
It has been demonstrated that replay attack introduces 
distortions in the spoofed speech [9,10]. Most existing state 
of the art methods mainly rely on machine learning based 
approaches. These approaches process the input speech 
signal for feature extraction that are used to train a classifier 
to learn the underlying distortion model. For example, [19] 
authors proposed light convolutional neural network (LCNN) 
classifier to extract high-level features from the log power 
spectrum, together with a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). 
GMM, support vector machine (SVM) and i-vector Gaussian 
probabilistic linear discriminant analysis were employed as 
back-end classifiers [20]. However, little work has been done 
on replay attack detection using higher-order spectral 
analysis (HOSA) features to capture traces of replay attack 
distortion and detection. Additionally, no work has been 
reported to study possibility of replay attacks and their 
countermeasures in smart speakers’ environment. 
This main contributions of this paper are: 
1. This paper demonstrates that ASV feature of voice-
driven interfaces, e.g., Google Home is vulnerable to 
replay attacks and thus all the skills and actions built on 
these platform, including many having critical financial 
data, could be exploited easily even by relatively less 
tech savvy impersonators.   
2. According to best of our knowledge, there does not exist 
any attempt for the vulnerability analysis and 
exploitation of audio replay attack on Google home and 
Amazon Alexa. 
3. We have modeled replay attack as a higher-order 
linearity beyond 6th-order (see Figure 2).  
4. A countermeasure based on HOSA framework is 
proposed to detect reply attack.  
II. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF REPLAY ATTACKS IN 
SMART SPEAKERS 
This section describes vulnerability analysis and 
exploitation of audio replay to understand what is the 
performance of Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) 
system used in the Amazon Echo and Google Home smart 
speakers We conducted several experiments to determine 
the capabilities of the ASV in these devices. 
A. Experiment 1 – Vulnerability Analysis of Replay Attacks 
in Amazon Echo 
We have tested the ASV capabilities of the Amazon Echo by 
placing an order for small items such as candy, as non-owner 
of the device. Amazon Echo ASV was unable to assess who 
was placing the order. Similarly, we found that any person 
could use the Amazon Echo to turn on and off IoT connected 
lights in the home. 
Despite the fact that all of the functions of the Amazon Echo 
are available to any user we did replay a recording of the 
device owner asking “Alexa, Who am I?”. The Amazon 
Echo replied with the device owners name. This further 
proved that what limited voice recognition the device has, it 
is not capable of distinguishing recorded audio from a real 
voice. 
B. Experiment 2 – Vulnerability Analysis of Replay Attacks 
in Google Home 
The Google Home device does use voice recognition to offer 
secure purchases and access control. However, our 
experiment revealed that the speaker verification is limited to 
authenticating the wake word, usually “OK Google”. Once 
the wake word has been used to activate the device no further 
voice verification is performed on subsequent commands. 
This makes it possible for anyone that has a recording of the 
owner using the wake word to then have full access to the 
device.  
To verify that only the initial wake word “OK Google” is 
checked, we took a recording of the account owner saying 
the wake word and then added in a completely different 
voice requesting to purchase something. At no point in time 
did the device question why a different voice was given to 
the device. 
In another test, we took a recording of the male account 
owner saying, “OK Google” and then followed it up with a 
recording of a female voice saying, “Who am I?” the Google 
Home device responded with the male account owners name. 
It shows that Google Home performs voice verification only 
on the wake word.  
C. Experiment 3 – Introduction of multiple replays using 
Drop in conference feature of Amazon Echo. 
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrates that the speaker 
verification capabilities of the current generation of smart 
speaker devices are limited. While on the surface it appears 
that since smart speakers are located within the users home 
the damage to be done is limited to some mischief by people 
near the device. We considered if the capabilities of smart 
speakers could be exploited to unlock an IoT connected door 
system or change the settings on an IoT connected 
thermostat. To better understand the severity of audio replay 
attacks, consider a home that uses a Google Home device to 
control a door lock. All that would be required to unlock the 
doors of that home would be a replay of the owner using the 
wake word. This could be a genuine copy or a synthesized 
voice. Once the wake word is played and accepted, any voice 
could request the doors to be unlocked.  
For this experiment we hid an Amazon Echo device behind a 
TV. We then used the Drop In Audio conferencing feature of 
the Amazon Alexa to replay voice recordings to the Google 
Home Speaker. We were able to replay a recording of “OK, 
Google, Turn on Office Lamp” via the audio conferenced 
Amazon Alexa from another home. The Google Home 
device did turn on and off the lights as requested in the 
replays.  
One can envisage that while the Drop-In feature of the 
Amazon Echo made it very easy to perform this type of 
attack, it would be relatively easy to use other equipment to 
replay the attack into a person's home. For example, one can 
use a RaspberyPI equipped with an MP3 board to replay the 
required sounds to get the smart speaker to unlock the doors. 
For the Internet connectivity required to perpetuate this type 
of attack this could be done by knowing the home owners 
WiFi key or using a Cellular WiFi hotspot device. 
 
 
 III. REPLAY ATTACK MODELING 
It has been demonstrated that replay attack introduces 
distortions in the spoofed speech [9,10]. Most of existing 
state of the art mainly rely on machine learning based 
methods. These approaches process the input speech signal 
for feature extraction that are used to train a classifier to 
learn the underlying distortion model. In this paper, we 
present a framework to model replay attack distortion, and 
then use a non-learning-based method for replay attack 
detection on smart speakers. As shown in Figure 2, the 
microphone and speaker are modeled as non-linear devices. 
The Mic-Speaker-Mic (MSM) processing chain of the replay 
attack, therefore, is expected to introduce nonlinearity in the 
resulting replay attack signal generated using proposed 
Alexa drop-in attack.  
 
IV. REPLAY ATTACK DETECTION FRAMEWORK FOR 
SMART SPEAKERS 
 
We propose to use higher-order spectral analysis 
(HOSA)-based features to capture traces of replay attack 
distortion and thus detect them. Details of the proposed 
approach is provided in the following subsections.  
A. HOSA-based detection:  
The microphone/specific distortions such as harmonic–, 
intermodulation (IM)–, and difference-frequency (DF)–
distortions. The presence of harmonic components at the 
output of a nonlinear system with pure tone input is called 
as harmonic distortion. System nonlinearity can cause IM 
distortion in the output when a complex signal (e.g., speech) 
is applied at the input of a nonlinear system. It causes the 
output signal to be sums and differences of the input signals 
fundamental frequencies and their harmonics, that 
is, ,  , ,  etc. Given a nonlinear 
system is excited with sum of sinusoids with same 
magnitudes then system nonlinearity can cause difference-
frequency distortion at the output, e.g.,  , , 
, etc. 
It has been shown in [9] that microphone response can be 
approximated using following discrete time-invariant 
Hammerstein series model, 
 
The microphone (resp. speaker) nonlinearity introduces 
higher-order correlations at its output. The MSM processing 
chain, therefore, can be modeled using a higher-order 
nonlinear system. To capture it HOSA is used. Specifically, 
higher-order cumulants (resp. bicoherence) [8] is used to 
capture higher-order correlations. The bicoherence, , 
of a signal y[n] is a normalized version of 2-dimensional 
Fourier transform of the third-order cumulants, that is, 
 
 
Here,  denotes third-order cumulant of y[n], 
and is defined as, 
 
Here, E{.} denotes expectation. Sometimes, it is more 
convenient to use the normalized value of the bispectrum 
which is also known as bicoherence. This bicoherence is 
given by the following equation [8], 
 
It is important to highlight impact of nonlinearity on 
bicoherence spectrum. Consider a pair of sinusoids with 
frequencies and ; the IM distortion will result in a new 
signal at   whose magnitude is correlated to 
and , which will result in a high magnitude value in the 
bicoherence magnitude. Moreover, if the input sinusoids 
have phases,  and , then the phase of the nonlinearity 
 
Figure 1: A scenario of Drop-in conferencing features of Echo device to generate replay attack on Google Home’s ASV system 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Replay attack modeling 
induced intermodulation components  are . It 
is easy to see that the bicoherence has a zero phase and a 
bias towards  /2 may also occur due to harmonic auto-
correlations. In general, the average bicoherence magnitude 
would increase as the amount of quadratic phase-coupling 
(QPC) grows. It can be concluded that a replay attack is 
expected to: (i) increase in the magnitude of bicoherence for 
certain harmonics, and (ii) the phase of bicoherence bias 
towards 0 and/or  /2 at IM distortion frequencies. 
To capture traces of a replay attack, intermodulation 
distortion, QPC, Gaussianity test statistics, and linearity 
statistics can be used. For this paper, QPC, Gaussianity test 
statistics, and linearity statistics are used. The motivation 
behind focusing on intermodulation distortion is that it is 
more dominant in the cloned signal. To verify this claim, we 
estimated the bicoherence from both the speech and the 
corresponding cloned recordings. Shown in the left panel of 
Fig. 3 is the bicoherence magnitude plot of an audio 
recording and in the right panel is the bicoherence 
magnitude plot of the cloned recording. 
 
 
Figure 3: Shown in the top-left panel is the bicoherence magnitude plot for direct recording and top-right panel is the corresponding RA 
recoding. In the left-bottom panel is the phase bicoherence phase plot for the direct and RA recordings. 
 
It can be observed from Fig. 3 that there is significant 
intermodulation distortion spread in the both bicoherence 
magnitude and phase spectra replay-audio recordings.  
3.2 Gaussianity test statistics and linearity test statistics-
based detection: 
Gaussianity and linearity statistics tests can also be used 
to confirm non-Gaussianity and nonlinearity in a given 
stationary time series. It is reasonable to assume that bona-
fide and relay attack speech signals are stationarity 
sequences. Moreover, bone-fide speech signal is also 
modeled as a non-Gaussian random sequence. The MSM 
processing chain of replay attack is expected to introduce 
nonlinearity in the resulting sequence. Let x(n) is non-
Gaussian speech sequence and y(n) is linear non-Gaussian 
sequence of replay attack. How do we know that x[n] is 
non-Gaussian and y[n] is non-Gaussina and nonlinear? To 
achieve this goal, Hinich’s non-skewness (also known as 
Gaussianity) and linearity tests [11] is used.  
These tests relay on the fact that if the 3rd-order cumulants 
of a stationary process are zero, then its bicoherence is zero, 
and non-zero bicoherence implies that process is non-
Gaussian. Moreover, if that the process is linear and non-
Gaussian, then the bicoherence is a nonzero constant. 
Following binary hypothesis testing can be used for non- 
Gaussianity and nonlinearity detection:   
H1 : the bispectrum of y(n) is nonzero and not constant; 
H0 : the bispectrum of y(n) is nonzero and constant. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
For data collection, we used the Drop In Audio conferencing 
feature of the Amazon Alexa to replay voice recordings to 
the Google Home Speaker. We replayed a recording of 
“OK, Google, Turn on Office Lamp” via the audio-
conferenced Amazon Alexa from another home. In second 
settings, we turned on and off the lights using Google Home 
remotely using Drop-in features of Alexa, as described in 
Figure 01. A total of 12 original recordings were replayed 
twice a) once at 1st point of replay to obtain set of twelve 1st 
order replay audios; b) The 1st order replay audios were 
replayed again at 2nd point to get another set of 2nd order 
replay cloned audios (See Fig.1). Next, we performed 
following three experiments. 
 
Experiment 1: The goal of this experiment is to 
investigate impact of replay attack on bichorence magnitude 
and phase spectra. To this end, both the direct speech and 
RA recordings are segmented into frames of duration with a 
50% overlapping factor. Bicoherence is estimated from each 
audio segment using the direct (fft-based) approach [8]. The 
bicoherence is estimated with the following parameter 
settings: 1) 1024-point segment length, 2) 1024-point FFT 
length, 3) 50% overlap, and 4) Rao-Gabr optimal window 
for frequency domain smoothing. Shown in Fig. 4 are the 
bispectrum magnitude and phase plots estimated from direct 
speech and corresponding RA recordings for third 
successful attack.  
It can be observed from Fig. 4 that RA causes higher-order 
nonlinearity which is evident both in the magnitude and 
phase spectra. Similar, observations are made for other two 
other attacks.    
Experiment 2: The goal of this experiment is to 
investigate impact of replay attack on Gaussianity test 
statistics and linearity test statistics. To this end, test 
statistics is calculated from both bona-fide and replay 
speech signals. To achieve this goal, Hinch’s Gaussianity 
and linearity test statistics is calculated using glstat function 
available in the HOSA Matlab Toolbox [21], which can be 
used to estimate both Gaussianity test statistics and linearity 
test statistics. Frame-level Gaussianity test statistics and 
linearity test statistics are estimated from direct and RA 
attack recordings. It is observed that for all three RA 
recordings every non-silence frame failed Gaussianity and 
linearity test; whereas, all three direct recordings only less 
than 35% non-silence frames failed Gaussianity and 
linearity test. These findings confirm that RA introduce 
nonlinearity which can be used from RA detection. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Shown in the top-left panel is the bicoherence magnitude plot for direct recording and top-right panel is the corresponding RA 
recoding for. In the left-bottom panel is the phase bicoherence phase plot for the direct and RA recordings. 
 
Experiment 3: The goal of this experiment is the 
investigate impact of 2nd–order replay attack. It is expected 
that of 2nd–order would even introduce higher level of 
nonlinearity and stronger QPC. To validate this claim, a 2nd-
order RA was recorded for all three attacks. Parametric QPC 
detection is applied on three direct speech, three 1st order 
RA, and three 2nd-order RA recordings. Shown in Fig 5 are 
the scatter graphs of frame-level QPC frequency locations 
estimated from all nine recordings.   
It can be observed from Fig. 5 that RA causes shift of QPC 
peaks. This observation is consistent for all 1st – and 2nd –
order replay attacks. Shift in QPC can be used for RA 
detection. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated that the automatic speaker 
verification system used by Google home and Amazon Echo 
gadgets is vulnerable to replay attacks and thus all the skills 
and actions built on these platform, including many having 
critical financial data, could be exploited easily even by 
relatively less tech savvy impersonators. We performed 
vulnerability analysis and detection of replay attack using a) 
Drop-in features of Alexa by exploiting the replay attack at 
the Google Home, b) Alexa default services as well as skills 
developed using Alexa skills kit, c) Google home voice 
authentication. 
 Evaluation of proposed framework shows that HOSA-based 
features could be used to thwart replay attacks on Google 
Home and Amazon Alexa platform. More specifically, we 
demonstrated that RA causes higher-order nonlinearity 
which is evident both in the magnitude and phase spectra. 
Our results confirm our hypothesis that non-linearity 
introduced in RA can be used for its reliable detection 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Scatter graph of frame-level QPC locations estimated 
from direct speech, 1st–order RA, and 2nd–order RA recordings. 
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